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Abstract 
Academic debate over the „competition-fragility view‟ and „competition-stability view‟, in 
context of the risk shift and franchise value paradigms has lead to study the concept and 
relationship of competition and riskiness of banks in detail. In this respect, Martinez-Miera 
Repullo 2010 (MMR model) has even propagated the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between stability and competition. We test these hypotheses on a sample of Indian banks using 
measures for stability and riskiness of banks. The paper investigates the impact of bank 
competition and impact of bank concentration on stability, as well as on the riskiness of their 
loan portfolios .We find evidence for the presence of non-linear relationship between stability 
index and competition. It may be pointed out that in case of Indian banks, both concentration and 
competition work simultaneously to support the competition-fragility view. Both increased 
concentration and decreased competition may lead to greater riskiness with greater instability. 
The study suggests that it is important to understand the tradeoff between competition and 
concentration, and their impact on riskiness of loan portfolios and stability of banks for 
formulating steps to foster competition within the industry. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
In principle of banking supervision, banking competition may amplify the insolvency risk of 
financial institutions and in turn affect the stability of the entire banking system. As a result of 
competition, banks might invest in riskier loan portfolios and increase the credit risk in the form 
of non-performing loans which might eventually lead to bank failure .This is documented as the 
“franchise value paradigm” wherein it has been argued that the controlled competition should 
motivate banks to protect franchise values by investing in safety measures .This could be 
investing in riskier assets or maintaining low capital levels. Academic debate over this model 
begun with the work of Boyd and De Nicolo(2005).They modeled that competition may lead to 
increased default risks and greater bank instability. Later, the risk shifting paradigm which was 
proposed as an argument to it, suggested that an increase in competition could lower loan rates 
decrease credit risk and increase financial stability (Boyd et al.2006). 
In the last decade, extensive empirical literature has explored the links between competition and 
stability in banking system as a whole. In One of the views, as discussed above (the competition-
fragility view) it has been stated that competitive banking systems are more stable because the 
numerous lending opportunities, high profits, and charter values of indigenous banks makes them 
less interested in  excessive risk taking (Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004; Carletti, 
2008). On the contrary view (competition-stability view), it has been contended that competition 
among banks leads to less stable banking systems. This is mainly because the market power of 
banks results in higher interest rates for customers making it more difficult for them to repay 
loans .In turn, it increases the possibility of loan default and increases the risk of bank portfolios, 
consequently makes the financial system less stable (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005).  
A similar conclusion between competition and fragility emerges also from the works by Rochet 
and Vives (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), where increased deposit rates lead to more 
failures. Allen and Gale (2004) empirically test the relationship between competition and 
stability. The impact of consolidations and concentrations on stability and riskiness is also an 
open debate. Studies suggest that competition may have adverse impact on stability however 
competition may also lead to more aggressive risk taking Cerasi and Daltung (2000) and Keeley  
(1990). Literature focuses on the impact of market structure on the bank‟s incentives to take risk. 
Studies pointed out that how competition will decrease the ability of banks to take risk (e.g., 
Besanko and Thakor, 1993, Boot and Greenbaum, 1993, Allen and Gale, 2004. Particularly, a 
higher level of competition may induce banks to become cautious (Carletti,2007)Recently the 
work of Martinez-Miera and Repullo(MMR,2010)  has been popularized wherein their model 
identify the risk shifting effect in a more competitive banking set up. They hypothesize a non 
linear relationship among bank risk taking stability. 
The objective of this paper is to examine empirically the relationship between degree of bank 
competition, bank concentration , riskiness of loan portfolio and stability. We try to explore the 
relationship for Indian Banks as propagated by franchise value and risk shifting models to extract 
whether this relationship is U shaped and non-linear or a linear relationship according to the risk 
shift and franchise value models Our analysis of the Indian banking system helps us to use the 
database to construct concentration measures as well time varying PRH-statistic as a measure of 
competition. 
The study contributes to the existing debate on bank risk taking and degree of competition, 
concentration and also its effect across. Banking sector in India is characterized by the presence 
of public private and Foreign banks. The well developed and fundamentally strong system faces 
challenges in terms of increasing presence of foreign banks and increased instability due to non-
performing assets. Most studies study the relationship of either bank stability and competition or 
bank stability and foreign participation and ownership effects. However, in the present study we 
try to gauge all three relationships. The paper is organized as follows.Section 2 reviews the 
literature leading to the hypothesis development. Section 3 details the research methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the study with policy 
implicat 
ions. 
2  Literature Review 
In this section we highlight the major studies which have explored the competition stability 
relationship .we intentionally wish to assess the various competition measures as well as the 
riskiness measures which have been used so far understand this relationship. Seminal article by 
Keeley (1990) triggered the debate about competition and stability relationship.Demsetz(1996) 
show US banks with greater market power have largest capital ratios and greater asset 
volatility .Bofondi and Gobbi (2006 ) found that a bank‟s loan default rate increases as the 
number of banks in a market increases. The study is carried out for Italy.Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1998) show that the performance of US banks increased significantly with easy branch licensing 
and lifting up of barriers for operation of banks. The resultant increase in competition leads to a 
decline in profitability which counter the franchise value paradigm. However, Hannan and 
Prager (1998) documented the evidence that increased branch licensing leads to reduced 
profitability. Shaffer(1998) find that increased new entry marks greater competition in the loan 
market , which in turn increases the loans losses due to degrees of asymmetries in the 
information. The above studies focused on a single country analysis. 
As banks start gaining more and more market power they gain more franchise value. The 
franchise value represents the intangible capital and can only be nurtured if a bank survives. In 
such a situation banks take less risks and avoid holding risky portfolios. They will behave more 
prudently by holding more equity capital. 
Alternatively, as competition is decreases it might be possible that banks riskiness increases. In 
such a case banks possessing higher market power will earn more interest by increasing their 
interest rate due to a decrease in competition. 
There have been numerous studies in a cross-country institutional set up.one of the very major 
studies was by Beck et al. (2006), examining data from 69 countries over a 20 year period. The 
concluded that highly concentrated markets were related with greater risk of failures. Boyd and 
De Nicolo (2005), and Schaeck et al. (2006) argue that market power may make the banking 
system more fragile and unstable. Zhao et al.(2009) conclude that deregulation measures which 
aim at promoting competition in the early 90‟s lead to increased riskiness among Indian 
banks .Turk-Ariss(2010) assesses how various  degrees of market power affect bank efficiency 
and the stability in banking systems of developing countries. In a similar study, Casu and 
Girardone (2009) study the link competition and efficiency for banking sectors of five EU 
countries. They use Granger Causality tests and find a positive causation running from market 
power to efficiency, however, no evidence was found for the opposite causation. 
In a major study Berger et.al (2009) use data of banks from 23 countries, they find mixed results 
and light support to the competition-stability relationships. Very recently, Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo(2010) point towards a non-linear relationship between competition and stability. They 
suggest , from their empirical work that increased competition may decrease the default rate of 
borrowers (risk-shift effect), along with a decline in the interest payment from good loans these 
interest payment from performing loans may act as a cushion against loan losses(this is the 
margin effect).They suggest that the relationship between competition and stability may be be 
non-linear leading to a U-shaped curve when one is plotted against the other. It was further 
argued that in highly concentrated or lesser competitive markets, risk shifting effect dominates 
and greater competition will reduce riskiness of banks. Similarly in markets which are highly 
competitive margin effect will be prevalent and an increased competition will wear away the 
franchise value thereby encouraging risk taking. 
Concentration measures have largely been used by researchers to proxy for market power or 
competition in the industry. Boyd et.al (2006) use various measures of riskiness of banks to find 
empirical evidence in favor of risk shifting theory. They use HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index) 
as a measure of bank competition. They found an inverse and significant relationship between 
bank stability and HHI, implying that market with greater concentration will lead to greater risk 
failures. De Nicoló and Loukoianova (2007) also found similar results when accounting for 
ownership of banks in the same equation. 
3 Data 
We use bank –level, balance sheet and income statement data for 68 Scheduled commercial 
banks , as obtained from data sources, CMIE Prowess, ACE Equity and Bloomberg.Data for all 
the public sector, private sector and foreign banks is obtained for a period of 15 years from 2000 
to 2015. In the process of collecting the data, banks with incomplete information were dropped 
from the panel. Banks with only three or more than three years consecutive observations were 
considered, while banks which undergo a merger were considered a collective unit after the 
merger, while considered as a separate entity before the merger took place. This forms an 
unbalanced panel 924 bank-year observations. 
In this paper, we use various measures of competition and concentration to analyze the 
competition stability relationship and to find evidence in favor of the MMR model , risk shifting 
or franchise value paradigm. We use two standard measures of bank concentration, HHI and 
CR(5) as in Jiménez et.al(2013).We also construct the yearly estimates of PRH or Panzer-Rosse 
statistic(PRH Statistic) using the non-linear estimation. This would give us yearly value for the 
degree of competition in the Indian banking industry. The computation of this statistic requires 
exhaustive bank-specific information and has been discussed in the coming sections. 
3.1 Measures of Concentration 
As evidenced from previous literature, we use the k-firm concentration ratio (CR k ) for assets , in 
this case we use 5 bank concentration ratio indicated as CR5, and the HHI or Herfindahl and 
Hirschman Index for assets as well as loans. 
 
3.2 Measure of Competition 
To measure the degree of competition we follow the reduced form revenue model as developed 
by Rosse and Panzer known as the PRH Statistic.  
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In the above model competition will be estimated using the sum of factor price elasticities of 
each of the bank specific factors. Therefore H will be computed as: 
𝑯 = 𝜷′
𝟏
+ 𝜷′
𝟐
+𝜷′
𝟑
         Equation 2 
However, as suggested by Bikker and Haaf (2002), ignoring the market dynamics due to 
institutional and regulatory changes , linear estimation without accounting for the market 
dynamics may lead to imprecise estimations of PRH statistic. This in turn could lead to incorrect 
inferences drawn on the nature of competition. Hence we multiply the elasticities of H by a 
continuous time curve model 𝒆 𝜷𝟒∗ 𝒕 .Therefore, if time = 0 this will imply that H is constant over 
time. As pointed out by Molyneux et al. (1994), without the assumption of this gradual change 
the results may be improper. We therefore introduce a time varying model for estimation of PRH 
statistic on  a year on year basis. 
As mentioned in literature we allow for the non- linear estimation of PRH statistic which gives 
us yearly estimates for the same. 
𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑹𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏 𝐥𝐧 𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏 𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑 𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 ∗  𝒆
 𝜷𝟒∗ 𝒕 +  𝜷𝟓𝒍𝒏 𝑷𝑨𝒊𝒕  +
 𝜷𝟔𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕  +  𝜷𝟕𝒍𝒏 𝑺𝑨𝒊𝒕  +  𝜷𝟖𝒍𝒏 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      
           ..Equation 3 
𝐸𝐸 =  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 
𝐶𝐴 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐴𝐿 =  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 
𝑃𝐴
= 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝑆𝐴
= 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟’𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 
 
𝑯 = (𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐 + 𝜷𝟑) ∗  𝒆
 𝜷𝟒∗ 𝒕        Equation 4 
  
In the table below we present the estimates of PRH statistics for each of the years from 2000 to 
2013.We however use the consolidated measure utilizing results from the non-linear regression 
estimates of each year(consolidating it into a single index),as a measure of the degree of  
competition for precisely estimating competition. We further use these estimates to model the 
competition-stability relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Yearly estimates of estimated PRH statistic 
Year PRH-Stat 
2000 0.136641 
2001 0.115403 
2002 0.550474 
2003 0.379444 
2004 0.583852 
2005 0.377043 
2006 0.183406 
2007 0.064245 
2008 0.081895 
2009 0.136443 
2010 0.081643 
2011 -0.454101 
2012 0.074288 
2013 0.173269 
2014 0.066234 
 
The coefficient of unit cost of funds comes out to be most significant in all the cases , and 
invariably the highest contributor to the H -statistic as well. It can also be seen that the H-statistic 
was higher for beginning of the period, 2000, than for the end of the period i.e 2014.This 
highlights the decline in the degree of competition over the period. 
3.3 Measure of  bank Stability and Riskiness 
As a measure of the Default risk or bankruptcy risk we calculate the Z –index for each of the 
banks over the 15 period horizon. It measures the probability that loss in a particular year will be 
greater than the equity capital of banks. Normalizing the returns and the bank‟s equity by bank‟s 
assets and utilizing Chebishev
1
 inequality we obtain a Z index inverse of which gives us the 
probability of book value insolvency (See Hannan Henweck (1956), Yayati and Micco 
(2007),Sinha et.al
2
 (2011)).This will lead us to the estimation of Z-Index in the following manner 
                                                          
1
 Accounts that in all proabibility distributions all values are close to the mean 
2.The authors use Z-Index to evaluate riskiness of Indian Banks. 
 
𝒁 − 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 =  
𝝁
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕+
𝑬𝑸𝒊𝒕
𝑨𝒊𝒕
𝝈𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
𝟐         Equation 5 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  are bank i‟s return over asset and equity respectively in period 
t.μ
ROA it
 and σROA it
2  are the mean and the variance of the distribution of ROAit .We estimate Z 
index for each bank and each year. As our estimate of variance and mean of ROA we use the 
three year estimation window. 
A smaller value of Z -index is associated with greater riskiness implying lesser return on assets, 
greater volatility in returns, lower capitalization or higher leverage. Z index may therefore be 
considered as a composite index based on all the three factors of riskiness. 
Indian banks face an increasing pressure due to the riskiness of their loan portfolio. As a measure 
to gauge this riskiness we include non-performing assets to total assets ratio
3
 (Berger et al. 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The authors argue that an increase riskiness of loan portfolio may not always imply increase in overall riskiness of banks. Therefore, they use 
alternative measures such as Z-Index to gauge overall riskiness of banks. 
 Table 2: Description of the variables used in the study. 
Variable                                               Description Source 
Dependent  variables    
NPLs The bank-level ratio of non-performing 
assets to total loans; higher the value 
riskier the loan portfolio 
CMIE, Prowess 
Z-Index The bank-level Z-Index; higher value 
higher is the stability 
Author Constructed 
Explanatory Variables   
PRH statistic A yearly statistic computed from Panzar- 
Rosse Reduced form revenue equations, 
but through in a non- linear estimation 
technique. 
Author Constructed 
HHI Assets A yearly indicator of bank concentration , 
computed as Herfindahl Assets Index 
Author Constructed 
HHI (Loans) A yearly indicator of bank concentration , 
computed as Herfindahl Loans Index; 
higher value indicating higher 
concentration 
Author Constructed 
CR5 An indicator of bank concentration , 
calculated by taking a sample of top 5 
banks in  terms of asset size 
Author Constructed 
Bank Size Natural Logarithm of total assets CMIE Prowess, 2015 
Loan to Asset Bank level indicator of total loans to total 
assets 
CMIE Prowess, 2015 
Capital to assets Bank level indicator of total equity 
capital to total assets 
CMIE Prowess, 2015 
Liquidity to asset ratio A bank-level ratio of total liquidity to 
total assets 
CMIE Prowess, 2015 
GDP Growth A yearly indicator business cycle effect , 
in terms of Gross  Domestic Product 
growth 
World Bank Database 
Inflation (CPI) Yearly CPI Inflation values World Bank Database 
Foreign ownership Percentage of assets owned by foreign 
banks calculated as ratio of foreign bank 
assets to total bank assets. 
Author Constructed  
 
 
4 Model Description 
 To test the various hypothesis under the MMR, risk shifting and franchise value paradigm, we 
examine the effect of bank competition on bank risk. The estimation takes the following general 
form: 
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒊𝒕 =
𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒕, 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒕
𝟐 , 𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒋𝒕, 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕                    
           Equation 6 
As a measure of measure of risk we use Z-index as well as NPA to total assets per bank per year. 
where the i subscript refers to a bank and the t subscript refers to  the year. The model examines 
the relationship between bank competition and bank riskiness. We control for bank specific 
characteristics using equity ratios and natural logarithm of total assets. The business cycle effect 
is controlled using GDP and Inflation.  
The dependent variable is the bank riskiness Z- index and the NPA ratio. To account for the 
persistence, in the dependent variable we include a lagged dependent variable among the 
explanatory variables. Bank specific factors, loan to total assets, total size and liquidity to total 
assets are included among other explanatory factors to account for bank specific fixed effects. 
Our primary objective is to capture the relationship between bank riskiness and competition .As 
a structure variable in our estimation we use various measures which could potentially capture 
the structure of Indian banking market. Firstly, we use CR5 which is the k-th bank concentration 
ratio of top 5 banks assets, second, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for loans as well HHI for 
asset. Thirdly, the time varying yealry PRH statistics(see table ) estimated through reduced form 
revenue equations estimated through a non-linear regression model. 
We also include the squared term of the structure variable in our model to address the MMR 
model hypothesis that the relationship between structure of banking market and riskiness is not 
linear. It might be possible that bank specific characteristics loan ratio, size and liquidity might 
be correlated to bank riskiness and NPA ratio. In such a scenario presence of lagged dependent 
variable alongwith the presence of endogenous factors, OLS estimation would give biased results. 
To overcome this, we use Arellano Bond (1991) GMM estimation technique. We use lags of the 
bank specific and market structure variables as instruments, and the validity of these instruments 
is tested using the Hansen J-statistic. We also test for the presence of autocorrelation. As  stated , 
there should be no second order autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The econometric model takes the following form: 
𝒁 − 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝒁 − 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝟏𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒕 + 𝜹𝟐𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒕
𝟐 + 𝜸𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕 +
 𝜸𝟑𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 +  ∅𝟏𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝒕 + ∅𝟐𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒕 + 𝜼𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕              Equation 7 
 
𝑍 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  , is the riskiness of bank 𝑖  in year 𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural logarithm of the total 
assets, 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of loans to total assets of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the ratio 
of liquid assets of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡 to total assets. 
As a structure variable we use CR5 Concentration ratio, HHI for loans, HHI for assets and loans 
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶′𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷′𝟏𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹′𝟏𝑯𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒕 + 𝜹′𝟐𝑯𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒕
𝟐 +  𝜸′𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸′𝟐𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸′𝟑𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 +
  ∅′𝟏𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝒕 + ∅′ 𝟐𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒕 + 𝜼′𝒊 + 𝜺′𝒊𝒕                                      Equation 8 
For loan portfolio risk, computed as mentioned above we use  Non-performing loan ratio, and as 
a measure of financial stability we use the bank level Z-indexes. We include squared structure 
term in our main equations to address the hypothesis of the MMR model, of the non linear 
relationship between market power and stability. 𝜂𝑖  accounts for the unobservable bank-specific 
effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  for the idiosyncratic error. As an evidence of in favor of risk shifting effect, we 
would obtain positive and significant signs for 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 .If we obtain negative and significant 
sign for 𝛿1 and𝛿2 , it would imply the presence of the franchise value effect. However, if we 
obtain significant values for both 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 with opposite signs it would still imply a non-linear 
relationship but would be a direct evidence for MMR model. 
 
 
 
 
5 Analysis 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the independent 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Summary           
Variables      
Capital to 0.1543 0.1164 0.2801 0.0000 0.0761 
Liquidity to 0.1566 0.1248 0.9801 0.0000 0.1046 
NPA 2.4252 1.2300 36.0400 - 3.2225 
Z-Index 26.1276 14.3640 133.8090 - 9.1477 
LnTA(size) 12.3401 12.4509 16.7029 6.5144 1.7174 
RoA 1.0975 1.0100 9.6400 - 1.0475 
HHI(Assets) 0.0640 0.0579 0.0901 0.0516 0.0130 
CR5 0.4141 0.4040 0.4780 0.3770 0.0351 
PRH Statisitc 0.1725 0.1364 0.5839 - 0.2362 
GDP 7.0021 7.2863 10.2600 3.8040 2.1882 
Inflation 6.8155 6.3532 11.9923 3.6848 2.8443 
 
The descriptive statistics reveal some interesting 
 
 
 
Table 4 : Cross Correlation Matrix 
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5.2 Econometric results 
Our empirical methodology proceeds in three steps. In the first step we estimate the non-linear 
yearly estimates of PRH statistic using the specification as in 𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑹𝒊𝒕=  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏 𝐥𝐧 𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒕 +
 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏 𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑 𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 ∗  𝒆
 𝜷𝟒∗ 𝒕 +  𝜷𝟓𝒍𝒏 𝑷𝑨𝒊𝒕  +  𝜷𝟔𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕  +  𝜷𝟕𝒍𝒏 𝑺𝑨𝒊𝒕  +
 𝜷𝟖𝒍𝒏 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕            
     ..Equation 3. We also compute the CR5, HHI for loans and 
assets separately for each year. In the second step, we hypothesize the relationship of market 
structure parameters with riskiness  banks as per our baseline specification in 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒊𝒕 =
𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒕, 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒕
𝟐 , 𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒋𝒕, 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕                    
           Equation 6.To 
this end, we test the relationship between stability and  three market structure variables , between 
competition and stability .In the third and final step we also see the impact of concentration and 
degree of foreign penetration on degree of competition (as measured by non-linear estimation  
PRH statistic)   
Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 presents the GMM estimation results for stability and riskiness against 
concentration and competition based measures. The validity of the instruments used in the 
models is satisfactory as shown by Hansen J-test. Additionally, since the models are estimated 
using first difference, we might get significant first order serial correlation. But the estimates 
show the presence of insignificant second order serial correlation in the residuals, in the absence 
of which inconsistency in the results would be implied. 
In all the six different regressions lagged endogenous variable (both NPA ratios and Z-indexs) is 
significant at 1% level, which confirms the persistence in the riskiness values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 : showing the relationship between Z index and PRH statistic 
The above figure shows a curvilinear relationship between Z index values and PRH statistic 
meausring competition.However, we need to document an empirical relationship by estimating 
GMM panel data model. 
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Table 5: Estimations showing relationship between Loan Portfolio riskiness and market 
structure variables (HHI,CR5,HHI(loans) 
Dependent Variable: 
NPA GMM estimation results 
Independent Variables HHI(Assets) Cr5 HHI(Loans) 
  Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E 
NPA(-1) 0.4635*** 0.0015 0.4716*** 0.0028 0.4969*** 0.00231 
Capital to Asset -3.7489 0.2118 -3.3409*** 0.3006 -3.6812 0.1742 
Size(lnTA) 0.3460*** 0.0271 0.3842*** 0.0725 0.3600*** 0.05131 
Loan To Asset 1.5428*** 0.3196 2.0679** 0.5188 1.01429* 0.45015 
Liquidity to Total Asset -0.7951*** 0.3340 -1.0436*** 0.3033 -0.7909*** 0.2546 
RoA -0.2571*** 0.0088 -0.2621*** 0.0144 -0.2895*** 0.0121 
Structure 0.0905*** 0.0004 0.5015*** 0.0674 0.0598*** 7.47E-05 
Structure
2 0.0021*** 0.0098 0.4313* 0.0653 0.0564** 4.52E-02 
GDP -0.0394*** 0.0049 -0.0355*** 0.0114 -0.1393* 0.0155 
Inflation -0.0098 0.0065 0.1044*** 0.0562 0.0150 0.02813 
Constant 0.0520** 0.0167 0.1015* 0.1240 -0.2298* 0.04426 
Prob(J-Stat) 0.486275 
 
0.371447 
 
0.3645   
AR(1) 0.1513 
 
0.1451 
 
0.1467   
AR(2) 0.1702 
 
0.164 
 
0.1479   
No. Of  banks 67 
 
67 
 
67   
       *, **,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%and 1% respectively. 
The results of  NPA ratio as a measure of riskiness are shown in Table 5.The  first column using 
HHI(assets) as a measure of competition shows that the coefficient of the linear term is 
significant and positive .It remains same when the alternative measures of market power are used 
be it , CR5 or HHI (loans).The coefficient of squared structure term is again positive and 
significant which indicates a significant positive relationship between NPA ratios and HHI or 
other concentration based competition measures. A comparable analysis using h HHI (loans)  
and CR5 also points out towards a positive relationship between market power and non 
performing loans ratio. Therefore in accordance with the “competition-fragility hypothesis” of 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) or the BDN hypothesis , we find sufficient evidence to conclude that 
market power is associated with riskier loan portfolios. The results are comparable and consistent 
among all the three concentration measures. 
In another estimation, see Table 6 (column 2) we use the PRH statistics (as a measure of 
competition) to map the relationship between riskiness of loan portfolio and degree of 
competition. The results show a statistically significant positive relationship between linear 
competition term whereas a significant negative relationship between squared competition term 
and stability. The results are indicative of the MMR model, or a downward shaped parabola with 
a positive linear term. It may be noted that increasing competition increases riskiness of the bank 
portfolios .This is again in support of the previous finding that higher market power or higher 
concentration leads to riskier loan portfolios 
In Table 7, GDP growth is positive and significant which indicates a positive effect of GDP on 
Z-index. Inflation measure is insignificant measure to influence Z indexs. All three structural 
variables were found to be strong and statistically significant .Bank Specific variables including 
size, liquidity loan ratios were found to be positively and significantly affecting stability. The 
concentration variables, HHI loans as well as assets and CR5 all are negatively affecting stability, 
however their squared structure term is significant and positive. This highlights a non-linear U 
shaped relationship between stability and concentration. The relationship between stability and 
concentration indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6: GMM estimations showing relationship between Z-index and PRH statistic and 
NPA and PRH statistic. 
Dependent Variable : Z index   
Dependent variable: 
NPA     
Independent variables Coefficient S.E Independent variables     
Z_INDEX(-1) 0.299569*** 0.00408 NPA(-1) 0.49393*** 0.0031 
Capital to Asset 3.005133*** 0.53487 Capital to Asset -3.9322*** 0.21974 
Size(lnTa) 2.043118*** 0.06885 Size(lnTa) 0.39183*** 0.05795 
Loan to Asset ratio -8.12973*** 0.87307 Loan to Asset ratio -0.5768 0.52658 
NPA 0.164719 0.01263       
Liquidity to assets 2.543028** 0.31361 Liquidity to assets -0.6627* 0.36698 
ROA 0.366779*** 0.04271 ROA -0.2876*** 0.01287 
H-Stat -3.367367** 0.63094 H-Stat 0.68974** 0.31622 
H-Stat^2 -3.966274* 0.60134 H-Stat^2 -0.7854* 0.44263 
GDP -0.097831*** 0.0196 GDP -0.1567*** 0.009 
Inflation -0.011128*** 0.05177 Inflation -0.0092 0.01967 
Constant -0.257984***  0.04409 Constant -0.169*** 0.02532 
Hansen J-stat Test     Hansen J-stat Test     
Prob(J-statisitc) 0.413313   Prob(J-statisitc) 0.31606   
A-B Serial Correlation 
Test     
A-B Serial Correlation 
Test     
AR(1) 0.0049   AR(1) 0.1436   
AR(2) 0.238   AR(2) 0.162   
*, **,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7 : GMM estimations showing relationship between Z –index and market 
concentration variables (HHI, Cr5) 
Dependent variable Arellano-Bond GMM estimation  Results 
Z-Index HHI (Loans) CR5 HHI (Assets) 
Independent Variables Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Z_INDEX(-1) 0.285851*** 0.0053 0.2859*** 0.0037 0.28197*** 0.00508 
Capital to asset 0.6885 0.6180 1.2755 0.8106 1.14292*** 0.51202 
Size 2.022012*** 0.1787 1.8408*** 0.1411 2.06878*** 0.19780 
Loan to asset -9.4451*** 0.6617 -10.8561*** 0.9234 -9.20725*** 0.71997 
NPA -0.1040*** 0.0060 -0.0454*** 0.0056 -0.09877*** 0.00802 
Liquidity to assets 1.8984*** 0.2554 2.2764*** 0.3039 2.09476*** 0.44774 
ROA 0.2851*** 0.0273 0.3609*** 0.0216 0.25602*** 0.03042 
Structure -0.0621*** 0.0131 -1.7090*** 0.2235 -0.05680*** 0.00431 
Structure
2 0.0013*** 0.0022 0.1620*** 0.0029 0.01721*** 0.00151 
GDP 0.0712*** 0.0094 0.1900*** 0.0174 0.04086*** 0.01991 
INFL 0.0855*** 0.0179 0.1765** 0.0919 0.11454*** 0.04866 
Constant 0.2838*** 0.0769 -0.0913 0.1841 0.21403 0.13965 
Hansen J-statistic 
      
Prob 0.203965   0.319282   0.575999   
AR(1) 0.0063   0.0066   0.0062   
AR(2) 0.1273   0.1897   0.1113   
No. of banks 67   67   67   
*, **,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%and 1% respectively. 
 
However as argued by Berger (2010), even if market power in banking leads to riskier loan 
portfolios, or the increase in the competition level leads to increased riskiness of the bank 
portfolios, the overall riskiness of banks may or may not increase. The Table 6 and Table 7 
address this issue by examining the impact of these structure variables as well as degree of 
competition on Z-index, which is as an inverse proxy of overall bank risk. A higher Z-index 
might be a result of higher returns or higher capital ratios, which is a measure of stability. The 
result in Table 7 shows that the linear terms of the structure measure are negatively related to Z 
index , however, their squared market power terms is positive. This result is consistent with the 
inverse U shaped function under the MMR model under the concentration fragility view. The 
stability of the banking sector decreases with increasing degree of concentration, however, after 
a certain point this relationship becomes positively related thereby indicating that higher market 
power would increase stability. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005;2006) predict that if interest rates are 
high, it is more likely that the loans will become bad assets. Consequently risk of these loans 
defaults increases the bank failure likelihood. In case greater competition leads to lower loan 
rates being charged, it could reduce the probability of default thereby increasing stability (risk 
shifting effect).Liu et.al(2010) noted that risk shifting effect is more dominant in more 
concentrated banking markets. 
The empirical results of Z index with PRH statistics point towards a decreasing linear 
relationship between competition and stability. The findings provide evidence to the 
“competition fragility” view. This may be due to the fact that when monopoly power is exercised, 
bank will try to limit their risk taking in order to maintain their quasi monopoly rents given to 
them by government charters. When banks compete in the same market place, in the presence of 
higher competition they lose their market shares. Therefore more competition will erode away 
their franchise value and lend them to become less stable (as they tend to take more risks). 
Additionally as pointed out by Allen and Gale(2004), when the degree of competition among 
banks increases, banks have the least incentive to carefully screen their borrowers , which in turn 
increases their instability. Another issue which affects fragility in a highly competitive set up is 
the inter-banking market. Banks which operate in a competitive set up are price takers. They will 
have to charge lower interest rates to protect their market shares which would decrease their 
returns and ultimately affect the stability. 
Finally, we briefly discuss the results pertaining to our control variables. Firstly, as we would 
expect banks with greater loan to asset ratios have greater riskiness and lower stability. This is 
indeed understood from the relationship of greater loan to asset ratios to greater   non-performing 
assets. With respect to GDP we find a significant negative relationship between GDP growth 
riskiness of loan portfolios. However, when we replace our riskiness measure with Z-index , as a 
measure of stability we find that this relationship becomes significantly positive. Larger size in 
terms of assets contributes to greater stability as well as increased riskiness. As expected, greater 
profitability margin is significantly related to higher stability and lower riskiness of loan 
portfolio 
In the next sections of the study (see Table 8)we would like to derive a relationship between 
competition, concentration and the effect of entry of foreign banks entry into the banking system. 
Specifically , we would want to know whether the increasing participation of foreign banks , 
decreasing concentration is hindering or fostering the formation of a competitive set up for 
Indian banks or not. We estimate this relationship by following a simple linear regression 
analysis using annual data on PRH statistics, HHI concentration index, foreign ownership and 
profitability. 
Table 8: Estimation showing relationship between foreign penetration , competition and 
concentration  
Dependent variable : PRH 
statistic         
Independent  Coefficient S.E Coefficient  S.E 
Concentration((HHI(assets)) -1.547865 1.171912  -  - 
Concentration(CR5)  -  - -0.701641 0.577168 
Foreign bank share 5.16661 1.57893 5.80814 11.223 
GDP 0.010276 0.003822 0.010352 0.003895 
Inflation -0.023981 0.003828 -0.025237 0.004197 
LnTA(Size) -0.003183 0.020201 -0.002836 0.020248 
RoA 0.005619 0.008456 0.005705 0.008461 
Constant  3.893446 0.604924 4.194493 0.812253 
R-squared 0.337255   0.337048   
     *, **,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
The results of the above Table 8 indicate that there exists a significant negative relationship 
between market concentration and competition, which means that higher concentration, leads to 
lower competition. The result is consistent with the empirical literature on the same. Furthermore, 
increasing share of foreign banks in the total assets of the banks, lead to an increase in the 
competition level within the country. This highlights the importance of foreign banks penetration 
in the country. The results are consistent with Classens and Laeven (2004), who showed that 
higher foreign bank participation was associated with higher competition. We also find that 
higher competition is related to reduced bank profitability, although insignificantly, and 
competition is also negatively related to bank asset size. Larger bank asset may amount to 
reduced market powers implying lesser competition. 
6 Conclusion 
Under the traditional view of competition-fragility, greater bank competition will erode away 
market power and will decrease profit margin resulting in reduced franchise value. This would 
motivate banks to take more risk to increase their profitability. Alternatively, under the 
competition-stability view, greater market power in the market may also lead to higher risk 
taking. Both these views are also documented as risk shift and franchise value models. However, 
under the MMR model banking competition and stability have found to be linked in a non-linear 
manner. Berger et.al (2009) argues that competition and concentration may coexist in a market 
and can induce fragility or stability at the same time. Against this backdrop, it is of interest to 
assess the relationship between bank competition, concentration and bank fragility in case of 
Indian banks. The paper investigates the impact of bank competition and impact of bank 
concentration on stability, as well as on the riskiness of their loan portfolios. We also investigate 
whether this impact is linear or non-linear, in line with risk shift and franchise value models, in 
line with MMR model.  In addition we also investigate the effect of foreign bank penetration on 
bank competition as measured by PRH statistic, and the relationship between bank concentration 
and competition. We use data for 68 Indian banks from 2000 to 2014 .The main results highlight, 
that higher concentration may lead to higher riskiness of loan portfolio; however this is offset by 
increasing competition which will decrease the riskiness. Evidently, it may be noted that 
increasing concentration or decreasing competition leads to greater riskiness of the loans 
portfolios. We find presence of a non-linear relationship or a U shaped pattern between 
competition and loan portfolio riskiness, in support of the MMR model. With respect to stability 
as measured by Z-Index, we find a significant negative relationship between stability and 
concentration, while this relationship is negative for competition as well. While higher 
concentration and lower competition may increase riskiness with respect to loan market, it may 
also decrease overall riskiness of banks (measured by Z index). 
Finally, it may be pointed out that in case of Indian banks, both concentration and competition 
work simultaneously to lend support to the competition-fragility view. Increased concentration 
and decreased competition may lead to greater riskiness and greater instability. The 
understanding of this tradeoff between completion and concentration, and its impact on riskiness 
of loan portfolios and stability of banks is important to formulate, and devise steps to foster 
competition within the industry. 
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